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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
This rule is the great weight of authority in the American juris-
dictions. In a small minority of jurisdictions it is specifically
provided by statute that color of title must be recorded to be
effective in adverse possession.
Whether a claimant holds under color of title, or claim of
title without color, there must be an adverse possession. There
must still be an actual, visible, exclusive, hostile, open and notori-
ous possession of such a character as to raise a presumption of
notice, and so brought home to the owner as to enable the latter
to institute an action for possession during the running of the
statute of limitations. Though a recording may prove very use-
ful in evidence to establish these requirements, the recording
adds nothing that is not already required.
The American common law does not require the color of
title be recorded before it may be used in adverse possession,
and until it is specifically required, there is no basis for assum-
ing that color of title must be recorded in Montana.
DONALD OLSSON.
'2 C.J. Adverse Possession § §348, 349, 350.
2Supra note 22.
THE CHARITABLE TRUST DOCTRINE IN MONTANA
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Trusts, from an early time, have been administered ex-
clusively as a part of equity jurisprudence. They are classi-
fied in two general categories-private trusts and charitable
trusts. Closely related to, and treated in most classifications
with, charitable trusts are unconditional gifts to charitable
corporations and gifts to charitable corporations for specific
purposes. Gifts to unincorporated charitable associations are
also included under the general heading of charitable trusts.
Chancery courts in England enforced charitable trusts be-
fore 1601 as a part of their inherent jurisdiction of equitable
suits. Due to neglect in their enforcement, the Statute of
Charitable Uses was passed in that year.' This statute pro-
vided new methods for the enforcement of charities and also
named some of the more common charities of the day.
An early U.S. Supreme Court case had much to do with
the development of the doctrine in this country. This case was
143 Emz. e. 4.
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The Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's
Executors.' A testator bequeathed money to the Baptist asso-
ciation for youths of the Baptist denomination "who appear
promising for the ministry." Chief Justice Marshall wrote the
opinion in the above case dealing with this bequest, in which
the court held that the trust failed because of a lack of definite
beneficiaries. Recognizing that a different result would be
reached in England under its statute, the court pointed out that
the English Statute of Charitable Uses had been repealed by the
Virginia legislature. It was argued that equity courts had in-
herent jurisdiction over charitable trusts but the court held, due
to a lack of historical material and law reports on the subject,
that enforcement of charitable trusts was dependent on the
Statute of Charitable Uses.
The requirements necessary to constitute a valid charitable
trust came before the U.S. Supreme Court again in 1844. This
time, in the case of Vidal v. Girard's Executors,' the court up-
held a charitable trust in which the beneficiaries were very in-
definite. In the interval between the two decisions, English re-
ports of early chancery cases were published and received in
this country. These reports disclosed that charitable trusts were
enforced in England long before the Statute of Charitable Uses
was passed. Because of this information, the court in the Vidal
case upheld the trust, relying on the inherent jurisdiction of
equity courts to deal with charitable trusts.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court corrected its view in the
Vidal case, the holding of the Baptist Association case already
had led to many varied views by state courts. Some held that
the Statute of Charitable Uses was a part of their common law
and thus recognized the doctrine. Others held that the English
statute was not a part of their common law, and charities were
recognized only by express statutes to that effect. Still other
jurisdictions upheld these trusts, regardless of whether or not
the English statute was a part of their law, on the grounds of
inherent equity jurisdiction over charitable trusts.'
While Montana has a constitutional provision' recognizing
the possibility of charitable trusts, there are no statutory pro-
visions directly providing for, or prohibiting, charitable trusts.
'(1819) 4 Wheat. 1, 4 L. ed. 499.
3(1844) 2 How. 127, 11 L. ed. 205.
42 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §322.
"MONT. CONST. Art. XIX, §5: "No perpetuities shall be allowed, except
for charitable purposes."
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Section 91-142 (7015)' indicates the possibility of the doctrine.
However, Section 86-207 (7884)' provides:
S... a voluntary trust is created, as to the trustor and
beneficiary, by any words or acts of the trustor, indicat-
ing with reasonable certainty:
1. An intention on the part of the trustor to create a trust;
and,
2. The subject, purpose and beneficiary of the trust."
Since the beneficiaries of a charitable trust must be indefinite,
does this mean there can be no charitable trusts in Montana?
Section 91-104 (6977)8 states who may take by will, but unin-
corporated charitable associations are not included in that
statute. Are bequests and devises to charitable unincorporated
associations invalid because they are not expressly included in
this code section?
II. MONTANA CASES
The first Montana case dealing with charitable trusts is
In Re Beck's Estate,' decided in 1912. A testator left the residue
of his estate to the Montana State Orphans' Home, an unincor-
porated state institution. The Montana Supreme Court held that
the residuary bequest to the Orphans' Home was void. The
grounds were that the right to make testamentary disposition of
property depends entirely upon the will of the legislature and
a necessary postulate of this proposition is that the legislature
has the exclusive power to designate those whom the testator may
make the objects of his bounty. The court said that the Orphans'
6R.C.M. 1947: "Restriction to devise for charitable purposes---No estate,
real or personal shall be bequeathed or devised to any charitable or
benevolent society or corporation, or to any person or persons in trust
for charitable uses, except the same be done by letters duly executed
at least thirty days before the decease of the testator, and if so made
at least thirty days prior to such death, such devise or legacy, and each
of them, shall be valid; provided, that the prohibition contained in this
section shall not apply to cases where not more than one-third of the
estate of the testator shall be bequeathed or devised for charitable or
benevolent purposes."
This section was amended in Ch. 93, LAWS OF MONTANA 1945. The
word will was substituted for the word letters. Also the following
clause was added at the end of the statute: "and provided further,
that if any such devise or bequest be made in a will executed within
thirty (30) days prior to such death and be for more than one-third
(3) of the estate of the decendent, the same shall be void as to the ex-
cess over one-third (11), but as to that only."
7R.C.M. 1947.8R.C.M. 1947.
'44 Mont. 561, 121 P. 784.
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Home did not fall within the definition of a person or of a public
or private corporation within the meaning of R.C.M. 1947 Sec-
tion 91-104 (6977) which provides:
"Who may take by will-A testamentary disposition
may be made to any person capable of taking the property
so disposed of, except corporations other than those
formed for scientific, literary, or solely educational pur-
poses, cannot take under a will, unless expressly author-
ized by statute."
It was contended that the Orphans' Home could take as an
educational, charitable, or benevolent society under R.C.M. 1947
Section 91-142 (7015).' The court stated that the purpose in-
tended to be accomplished by this statute was, not to establish
charitable uses as they were known at common law, even
though the statute recognizes them, nor to enable any par-
ticular character of persons to accept a trust or bequest.
The court concluded that Section 91-142 (7015) was en-
acted to prevent improvident alienations to the detriment of
lawful heirs and that the statute goes no further than to im-
pose upon the right of disposition by the testator the limitation
therein prescribed.
It does not appear from a careful reading of the Beck case
whether the court would have sustained a bequest to trustees on
trust for charitable purposes or not. If so, it should have upheld
the gift to the Orphans' Home under the cy pres doctrine."
'
1Supra, Note 6.
n"The doctrine of cy pres with reference to charitable trusts is that
where a definite duty is to be performed, which cannot be done in
exact conformity with the plan of the person who has provided there-
for, such function or duty will be performed with as close approxima-
tion to the original plan as is reasonably practical." Vol. I BOUVIER'S
LAW DICTIONARY p. 745.
RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS §397 comment g: "Direct gift to unincorporated
charitable association-If the owner of property devises or bequeaths it
to an unincorporated charitable association, a charitable trust may be
created although the purposes of the trust are not mentioned in the
will. If the association is incapable of taking title to the property
and administering the trust, the court will appoint a trustee to take
the title and administer the trust for the purposes of the association.
3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS §397.2: "Gift to an unincorporated charitable asso-
ciation-If a devise or bequest is made in trust for a particular charita-
ble purpose and the testator names as trustee an unincorporated
charitable association which has no capacity to take title to the prop-
erty, the trust does not fail, but the court will appoint a trustee to
administer the trust. By the great weight of authority the result is
the same where a devise or bequest is made to the association directly
without mention of the purposes for which the property is given to It.
A bequest to such an association Is a bequest to be applied to the pur-
poses for which the association is created and Is in substance if not
4
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While the Beck case has been to a large extent ignored in later
Montana cases, it has left the law in confusion.
Soon after this case the Montana legislature enacted a
statute" which partially corrected the situation created by the
Beck decision by providing that unincorporated state institutions
could take by will. Still later, in 1927, a statute was enacted
providing that certain public institutions could take and hold
property' However, neither of these statutes included all unin-
corporated charitable associations. It is to be noted that the
California court, under the same statutory provision as our Sec-
tion 91-104 (6977), upheld a gift by will to an unincorporated
charitable association.' In 1931, the California legislature ex-
panded their statute to expressly include unincorporated chari-
table associations.' Due to the uncertainty created by the Beck
decision, it is suggested that Section 91-104 (6977) be amended
to include unincorporated charitable associations.
In a 1932 case' a testator left the residue of his estate to a
Minnesota charitable corporation. The question in the case was
whether or not a testator, domiciled in Montana, could make a
valid bequest of personalty to a benevolent, charitable, and
religious corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota. The
court cited the Montana statute" on who may take by will and
said that this statute contained no special prohibition against for-
eign corporations. The court said that testators in some states
are prohibited from giving any part of their property by will to
religious or benevolent corporations, but that in this state the
only prohibition of that nature is contained in Section 91-142
form a bequest in trust for the purpose of the association. It is im-
material that the bequest is in the form of a direct gift to the asso-
ciation and that the association has no capacity to take title to the
property given to it." Professor Scott criticizes cases which distin-
guish between a direct gift to an unincorporated charitable association
and those in which property is given to trustees upon trust for the
purposes of the association. The result is that a disposition for
charitable purposes fails because of the form in which the disposition
is made. He states that it seems absurd to defeat the lawful inten-
tion of the testator upon a ground which is purely technical. It is not
clear, in the Beck case, whether the will provision failed because of
this technical distinction which Professor Scott criticizes, or whether
it failed because the court was actually opposed to the charitable trust
doctrine.
-R.C.M. 1947 §91-105 (6978).
"R.C.M. 1947 §11-1006 (5668.17).
"Estate of Winchester (1901) 133 Cal. 271, 54 L.R.A. 281, 65 P. 475, 5
CAL. Ju. §24. However the court failed to refer to their statute In
this case.
ICAL. PROBATE CODE §27 (Deering 1937).
'In Re Hauge's Estate 92 Mont. 36, 9 P(2d) 1065.
"Supra, Note 8.
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(7015).' That statute was not applicable to the fact situation
in this case as the will had been in existence more than three
years prior to the death of the testator.
The court then applied the statute' providing for the in-
corporation of religious, charitable, and benevolent societies
which may take and hold by purchase, gift, devise, or bequest,
either real or personal property or both, or carry out the obliga-
tions or provisions of any trust imposed by will or deed of trust,
or otherwise, where the trust is created for any charitable pur-
pose. The court stated that if the legatee in this case was in-
corporated under Montana laws there would be no question re-
specting the power of the testator to bequeath, nor the power of
the legatee to receive the bequest. Since the laws of Minnesota
were found to be similar to the Montana statutes on charitable
corporations, the bequest to the Minnesota charitable corporation
was upheld.
In Town of Cascade v. County of Cascade' the testator had
bequeathed a certain sum to three trustees for the purpose of
establishing a library and gymnasium in the town of Cascade,
an unincorporated community, for the benefit of the town and
its inhabitants in perpetuity. The trust had been set up and
later the town was incorporated. The question in this case was
whether or not the trustees were liable for taxes on the prop-
erty, and the court held against the county on this issue. Fur-
ther, the court refused to consider the county's contention that
the trust was invalid, stating that, as no appeal had been taken
from the decree of final distribution, the decree was now con-
clusive. Here a true charitable trust had been created and was
in operation, although there were no Montana cases or statutes
stating that such trusts were valid. The case would seem to be
some authority for the charitable trust doctrine.
Another Montana case on this subject is Conley v. Johnson.'
One Clark and the Larable Brothers, Inc., a banking corpora-
tion, entered into an agreement which stated that Clark had
given in trust to the bank, the sum of $25,000 to the end that the
bank was to pay four percent interest on that amount to two
named trustees. These two trustees were to apply such interest
moneys for the repairing, replenishing, or supplying of musical
instruments to the band of the state prison at Deer Lodge, Mon-
tana, so long as the prison should have and maintain a band.
"Supra, Note 6.
19R.C.M. 1947 §§15-1401 (6453), 15-1402 (6454), 15-1403 (6455).
'(1926) 75 Mont. 304, 243 P. 806.
"(1936) 101 Mont. 376, 54 P (2d) 58.
6
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The main question argued on appeal was whether that part
of the agreement concerning the $25,000 deposit created a trust,
or whether a debtor-creditor relationship was established. The
bank contended that the payment of interest on the deposit was
a clear indication that the bank was to use the money as its own,
and therefore no trust was created. Further, the bank argued
that the use of the term "in trust" in the agreement did not
necessarily show an intention to create a trust. Though both of
these were strong contentions, the court, relying on the construc-
tion of the agreement, found that a trust was created.
No mention of the charitable trust doctrine was made in
the opinion. Although the court cited the statute which re-
quires a definite beneficiary,' no mention was made of the in-
definite nature of the beneficiaries here. Apparently the only
point raised and argued by counsel was whether this argreement
created a trust relationship or debtor-creditor relationship, and
so the court confined itself to that point. This was not a private
trust, but there was no language of charitable trust in the opin-
ion. Apparently the court assumed that the charitable trust doc-
trine was operating in Montana.
The foregoing cases comprise the Montana authority on
charitable trust up until 1948. There were no adjudicated cases
in the state reports which expressly held whether or not the
charitable trust doctrine was operating in Montana prior to the
recent case of In Re Swayze's Estate' decided in 1948.
The will of Mary Swayze contained the following provision:
"I direct my executor to reduce sufficient of my estate to
cash, such cash to be utilized for the erection and mainte-
nance of a modern hotel at Virginia City, Montana, where
no intoxicating liquors are to be sold at any time, said
hotel to be maintained as a memorial to me, and I direct
my executor to cause the formation of a corporation
(Italics mine) to be known as the Mary Swayze Memorial
Hotel Company, to which corporation said hotel is to be
conveyed, and by which it is to be maintained and oper-
ated. "
The majority opinion stated the general rule to be that
when a trust is created by will it is essential to its creation and
validity that it be materially certain in its material terms and
parts. Also that the subject matter and beneficiary of the trust
"Supra, Note 7.
3(1948) ...... Mont ........ 191 P (2d) 322.
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be designated with reasonable certainty, citing R.C.M. 1947 Sec-
tion 86-207 (7884).2 The court then went on to say:
"However, special consideration is given to gifts for
charitable purposes and in such cases the courts have rec-
ognized that it is open to the testator to leave to trustees
to select the way in which the charitable purpose is to be
applied. And where a charitable purpose is established,
the lack of certainty in the method of carrying out the
trust will be remedied by the court by some scheme to ac-
complish the charitable intent of the testator. Also, a
charitable trust is valid although its execution extends be-
yond the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities
or results in a suspension of alienation for a period of
time greater than that permitted a private trust. Art.
XIX, sec. 5, Mont. Const. But in order to establish the
application of these two rules to the instant case, it must
be first demonstrated that the trust to which they are ap-
plied is a charitable one. Section 374 of the Restatement
on Trusts, says: 'A charitable trust is created if it in-
cludes a purpose the accomplishment of which is beneficial
to the community'."
The three judges in the majority concluded that a hotel
is a private business enterprise and not a charity. Tlherefore,
as a private trust, it failed for lack of certainty and because
it would suspend the power of alienation for a period longer than
lives in being.'
The provision in the will in this case related to the forma-
tion of a corporation. However, by dicta, the majority opinion
recognized the charitable trust doctrine of transferring property
to trustees for charitable purposes as well as transferring prop-
erty to charitable corporations. The above quotation contains
language to that effect. Further the court stated that they
agreed that the modern trend should be to encourage the estab-
lishment of charitable trusts and they named hospitals, colleges,
research laboratories, art museums, churches, historical monu-
ments, libraries, homes for the aged and indigent, and even pub-
lic utilities as possible beneficiaries of charitable trusts. The
definitions which the court used included the complete charitable
trust doctrine.2
Both of the dissenting judges wrote opinions. Tracing the
historical background of Virginia City and noting that the only
21Supra, Note 7.
'See R.C.M. 1947 §§67-406 (6705), 67-407 (6706).2 The court cited Lord Machaghten's (in Income Tax Commissioners v.
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hotel there had burned down in 1937, both judges held that the
will provision in question was for a charitable purpose. Numer-
ous cases were cited which upheld inter vivos transfers of prop-
erty to trustees for charitable purposes, charitable trusts estab-
lished by wills, and also gifts to charitable corporations.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Although the gift in the Swayze case failed for the lack of a
charitable purpose, all of the judges recognized the validity of
charitable trusts and that the Montana statute' which requires
definite beneficiaries is not applicable to charitable trusts. A
California case,' under a similar statute, reached the same result.
This case indicates that the general law of charitable trusts
is in force in Montana. There are, however, two statutes which
might be held to put limitations on these trusts. One of these,
not previously mentioned in this article, is R.C.M. 1947 Section
86-105 (6787).- It lists only four purposes for which express
trusts may be created in real property, and if this statute were
held to apply to charitable trusts, many conceivable charitable
trusts would fail. The California statute, from which ours was
taken, was held not to be applicable to charitable trusts in real
Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 at 583) definition of a charity: "Charity in
its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief
of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the ad-
vancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the
community not falling under any of the preceding heads."
The court also quoted the definition of Justice Gray in Jackson v.
Phillips, 14 Allen, Mass., 539, 556: "A charity, in the legal sense, may
be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or
religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,
by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the
burdens of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called
charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described to show that it is
charitable in its nature."
The court further cited the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, §368 which
enumerates six charitable purposes: relief of poverty, advancement of
religion, promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, and
other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the com-
munity.
"Supra, Note 7.
"Estate of Hinckley (1881) 58 Cal. 457.
2"For what purposes express trusts may be created-Express trusts may
be created for any of the following purposes:
1. To sell real property, and apply or dispose of the proceeds in ac-
cordance with the instrument creating the trust;
2. To mortgage or lease real property for the benefit of annuitants or
other legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon;
9
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property,' but there are no Montana cases on this point. Just
as the Montana court in the Swayze case implied that the statute
requiring a definite beneficiary' was not applicable to charitable
trusts, it seems reasonable that the court would hold that this
code section was not intended to apply to charitable trusts.
The other Montana statute which possibly places limitations
on the charitable trust doctrine is Section 91-104 (6977).' As
we have seen it interpreted in the Beck case, this statute was
used to prevent an unincorporated state institution from taking
by will. The Swayze case did not directly overrule the Beck
decision as the fact situations are distinguishable, and further,
neither the Beck case nor Section 91-104 (6977) was discussed
in the Swayze opinion.
As there seems to be no public policy in opposition to allow-
ing charitable unincorporated associations from taking by will,
they should be allowed to do so. This could be accomplished by
the adoption of the cy pres doctrine previously discussed,' or by
amending Section 91-104 (6977), as California has done,"M to
expressly include unincorporated charitable associations.
J. W. BURNETT.
3. To receive the rents and profits of real property, and pay them to
or apply them to the use of any person, whether ascertained at the
time of the creation of the trust or not, for himself or for his fam-
ily, during the life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject
to the rules of sections 67-502 to 67-611 of this code; or,
4. To receive the rents and profits of real property, and to accumulate
the same for the purposes and within the limits prescribed by the
sections above enumerated."
'Supra, Note 28.
'tSupra, Note 7.
'Supra, Note 8.
'
3Supra, Note 11.
'"Supra, Note 15.
RELIEF IN EQUITY AGAINST PROBATE OF A WILL
PROCURED BY FRAUD
Although Section 91-1101 (10042)1 of the 1947 Revised
Codes of Montana has been held to be in effect a statute of lim-
itations, the running of which commences with the admission of
a will to probate,' and further held to be a bar to either direct
'R.C.M. 1947, §91-1101 (10042). "When a will has been admitted to
probate, any interested person may, at any time within one year after
such probate, contest the same or validity of the will."
'In Re Murphy's Estate (1920) 57 Mont. 273, 188 P. 146.
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